Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

Ida U. Stoker v. Karl S. Stoker : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Pete N. Vlahos; Attorney forAppellantFrank S. Warner;
Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stoker v. Stoker, No. 16376 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1686

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

rn THE

SUPRE~lE

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IDA U. STOKER,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 16376

vs.
Kb.TU. S. STOKER,

Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a Su!IDllary Judg!!lent Order of Judge Ronald 0.
Hyde of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah.

FRAN'.< S. WARNER, ESQ.
WARNER, UARQUARDT & HASENYAGER
Attorneys for Respondent
543 Twenty-Fifth Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

PETE i-1. VLJJIOS , ESQ.
VLAHOS , IGmWLTON & PERKINS
Attorneys for Appellant
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

FILED
AUG 71979

------·------···-----···-.........
an. .,.._ Cowt, Ut.i.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUT:IORITIES
CASES CITED
Childress v. Childress . . .
569 S.H.Zd 816 (Tenn. 1978)

10' 11

Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
244 S.E.2d 338 (W.Va. 1978)
DirGirolamo v. Ananavare . .
312 A. 2d 382 (Pa. 1973

15

Dutton v. Hi~htower & Lubrecht Construction Co ..
214 F.Supp. 98,300 (D.C. Mont. 1963)

10

Ebel v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
478 S.W.Zd 334 (!10. 1972)
Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
335 So.Zd 154,155 (Fla.App. 1978)
Hull v. Silver . .
557 P.2d 103 (Utah 1978)
Lusby v. Lusby . . . .
390 A. Zd 77 (Md. 1978)

7,8,14
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Orefice v. Albert. . .
237 So. Zd 142 (Fla. 1970)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Paiewonskl v. Paiewonsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
446 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1971)
Rubalcava v. Gisseman . . . .
384 P.Zd 389,394 (Utah 1963)

5 ' 6' 8' 13 ' 14

Short Line, Inc. of Penn. v. Perez
238 A.Zd 341 (Del. 1968)

11

State Farn Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Leary
544 P. Zd 444 (Mont. 1975)

10

Ta5lor v. Patten . . . . . .
Tl P.2d 696 (Utah 1954)

5' 13

Thompson v . Thonp son . . . .
218 U.S. 611,614,515 (1910)

3,9

Varholla v. Varholla
383 N.E.Zd 888 (Ohio 1978)

. . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES [cont'd]
STATUTES CITED
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code A.."lnotated 1953,
Code Annotated 1953,
Code Annotated 1953,
Code Annotated 1953,
Const. , art. IV, §1.

§30-2-1, et. seq.
§30-2-2
§30-2-4
§73-11-1.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4' 5' 6' 7
4,5,9
4' 5' 13
4' 6' 7
15

TABl.E OF cmITENTS
PRELIMINA.RY STATEMENT . . .

1

DISPOSITIOU IN LOWER COURT.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

2

ARGUMENT.

3

POrnT I
TEE LOWER COURT CORR.EC'i'LY RULED THAT
UTAH LAW DOES ~·WT GIVE A PERSOI~ A
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HIS OR HER
FORMER SPOUSE FOR A TORT, NEGLIGENT
OR INTENTIONAL, OCCURRING DURING THE
TE~1 OF THE MAR...~IAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
POINT II
JURISDICTIONS ANALYZING STATUTES
SIMILAR TO UTAH'S AGREE THAT THEY DO
NOT ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO BRING A
TORT ACTION AGAIHST ONE'S SPOUSE . . . . . . 8
POINT III
IF THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL
UfrlillHTY IS TO BE ABROGAT:::D IN UTAH,
SUCH CHANGE HUST cm'.!E FROM THE LEGISLATURE, NOT THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
CONCLUSION

13
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rn THI: SUPREME COURT
OF 'LHE STATE OF U'LAII

IDA U. STOKER,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 16376

vs.

KARL S. STOKER,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPmlDEnT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The issue before this Court is whether Appellant may
bring a personal injury lawsuit against her former spouse,
Respondent, for an alleged assault i:vhich occurred during
the period of their marriage, or whether such lawsuit
is barred by the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.
DISPOSITIOt~

rn LOWER COURT

On March 9, 1979, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact
that Appellant's action was barred by the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity.

Judge Hyde, ruling that a

wife has no cause of action against a husband for a tort,
negligent or intentional, occurring during the term of the
marriage, dismissed Appellant's Complaint.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOlIGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the District
Court's dismissal of Appellant's Complaint on the grounds
that this type of lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity.
STATEMEi1T OF FACTS
Appellant and Respondent were formerly wife and
husband, having been divorced in ApriL 1976.

On

December 15, 1978, Appellant filed this action seeking
damages for personal injuries suffered in an alleged
assault by Respondent on December 25, 1975.

The alleged

assault took place while the parties were still husband
and ·wife.
On January 9, 1979, Respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgnent, alleging that, even if Appellant could
prove the facts stated in her Complaint, her action would
be barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.

Respondent also argued that

Appellant's action was barred by a Release she had signed
in connection with the divorce settlement whereby she
relinquished all claims she might have against Respondent
arising out of the December 25, 1975 incident.
The lower court, while finding that material issues
of fact did exist concerning the validity of Appellant's
Release, nevertheless granted Respondent's
Summary Judgment.

~otion

for

Appellant's Complaint was dismissed

for the reason that spouses or former spouses may not
-2-
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sue one another for alleged tortious conduct which
occurred during the period of the marriage.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH LAW
DOI:S NOT GIVE A PERSON A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAillST EIS OR
HER FORMER SPOUSE FOR A TORT, NEGLIGENT OR INTEUTIONAL,
OCCURRING DURING THE TEHN OF THE MARRIAGE.
At common law it was clear that husbands and wives
could not sue one another for wrongful acts committed
during the perioci of their marriage.
Husbands & \Jives §522 p. 443.

See 41 Am.Jur. 2d

The original rationale

for this was based on the fact that the law regarded
married persons as a single legal entity.

Describing

the effects of this concept, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
. . the wife was incapable of making contracts,
of acquiring property or disposing of the same
without her husband's consent. They could not
enter into contracts with one another, nor
were they liable for torts committed by one
against the other. Thompson v. Thompson,
218 U.S. 611, 614, 615 (1910).
In response to the doctrine that married women had
no independent legal rights, almost every state enacted
some form of Married Women's Property Act in order to
give wives certain additional legal rights.

The ques-

tion before the Court in the instant case is whether
the Utah Legislature has enacted specific statutes which
change the common law interfamily immunity and give a
woman the right to sue her former husband for a tort
coITL.~itted

during the period of the marriage.
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The relevant Utah statutes are found in Sections
30-2-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) and Section 78-11-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

The ?ertinent

sections read as follows:
30-2-2. Contracts oay be made by a wife, and
liabilities incurred and enforced by or against
her to the same extent and in the same manner
as if she were unmarried.
30-2-4. A wife may receive the wa;es for her
personal labor, maintain an action therefor
in her own name and hold the sar.ie in her own
right, and ~ay prosecute and defend all
actions for the preservation and protection
of her rights and property as if unmarried.
There shall be no right of recovery by the
husband on accou..~t of personal injury or
wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected
therewith, but the wife oay recover against
a third person for such injury or wrong as
if unmarried., and such recovery shall include
expenses of medical treatment and other
exoenses paid or ass~ed by the husband.
78-11-1
.• ::::arried wo'.'lan oay sue and be
sued in the same manner as if she were
unmarried.
If Appellant has the right to sue Respondent for an
alleged tort cornnitted during their marriage, her right
must flow from these statutes, since it is clearly a
right she does not possess under the common law.

By

examining the three cases in which this Court has
previously construed the impact of these statutes on
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, it is evident
that the lower court was correct in ruling that Appellant
possesses no such right.
It should be noted that the first time the Court
considered this question, it concluded that the statutes
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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do allow a wife to sue her husband in tort.

In Taylor v.

Patten, 275 P.2d 696 (Ccah 1954), Justice Wade ruled that
a woman could sue her former husband for an assault which
occurred Hhile they were living apart during the interlocutory period of their divorce action.

However, this

Court later overruled the Tavlor decision in Rubalcava
v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389, 394 (Utah 1963).

In Rubalcava,

Justice Crockett seems to have adopted much of the
reasoning set forth by Justice Henriod in his dissent in
Taylor.

It thus becomes helpful to consider Justice

Henriod's analysis.
Justice Henriod points out that all ten of the sections of 30-2-1 through 10 deal

with certain specific

rights and obligations which a wife did not have at
cowlllon law.

He notes that, while there is no

reference

to tort liability of one spouse against the other, the
sections specifically and clearly spell out the property
rights and liabilities between spouses.

This detailed

enumeration of certain rights shows the legislature's
intent to

11
•

•

•

give a woman only those rights particu-

larized, which she did not have at common law, and not
those Hhich were not specified. 11

275 P. 2d at 701.

Focusing on the language of Section 30-2-2, he
illustrates that it was only intended to refer to a
,.1ife' s contractural rights.

:'he word "liabilities" in

that section deals only with contractural liabilities.
He notes that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

(i)f the section were intended to include torts
and all other rights and liabilities .
. all
of the other 9 sections which obviously deal
with specific and particular rights, which
'.1ives did not have at common law, are composed
of meaningless and wasted words.
275 P.2d
at 701.
Justice Henriod also states that 30-2-4 similarly
does not confer upon a wife the right to sue her
husband in tort.

This section is intended to give a

wife the right to keep her own wages and to seek, in
her own name, damages for torts committed upon her by
third persons.

He points out that

[n]othing is mentioned about any right
against the husband. Certainly the section does not clearly and soecifically
give her any such right, but negatives
any such right by allowing her to recover
only against third persons. If the legislature had intended to give her a right
against her husband, it simply could have
said she could "recover against all persons"
instead of against only "a third person."
275 P.2d at 701, 702. (Emphasis in original.)
The Justice concludes his opinion by pointing out that,
while there may be some very good reasons for allowing
a wife to sue her husband in tort, it is a w.atter for the
legislature and not the court.
The next Utah case to consider a spouse's ability
to sue the other spouse in tort was Rubalcava v. Gisseman,
supra.

Here the Court ruled that a wife had no right

to sue her husband's estate for injuries she suffered in
a car accident in which the husband had been driving.
The court again analyzed Sections 30-2-1, et. seq.,
together with Section 78-11-1, and concluded that they
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do not give a woman the right to bring a tort action
against her husband.

Justice Crockett, writing for the

majority, stated that statutes " . . . expressly allowing actions by the wife against the husband in respect
to contract and property do not compel the conclusion
that tort actions should also be included." 384 P.2d at
391.
Commenting on the effect of Section 78-11-1, Justice
Crockett notes that this statute
. . . is procedural, and serves only to
give the wife the privilege of suing to
protect whatever rights she may have but
does not purport to create for her any
new or substantive cause of action. Any
such right would be found in Title 30,
Husband & Wife, which particularizes the
rights which they possess under our law.
384 P.2d at 392.
He then illustrates, as did Justice llenriod, that the
specific rights given to married women in 30-2-1, et.
seq. do not include the authority for a wife to sue her
husband in tort.

"Had the legislature intended that she

have the right; it would have been set forth with the
rest; and its omission fairly implies that no such right
1Jas intended."

384 P.2d at 393.

This Court again examined the doctrine of interspousal tort inilllunity in Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103
(Utah 1978).

Tbe Court ruled that the doctrine did not

bar a wrongful death action brought against the husband's
estate by the heirs of the wife.

However, the holding

'Jas not based on an abrogation of the i=unity rule,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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but was based on an interpretation of Utah's wrongful
death statute.

Finding that this statute created in the

heirs

rather than a derivative, cause of

a

new,

action, the Court found that the action would lie
despite the fact that the wife herself would have been
barred by the ilIIIIlunity doctrine from

brin~ing

such an

action.
Justices Hall and Crockett, dissenting from the
majority opinion because of their disagreement with its
interpretation of the wrongful death statute, note that
"[t]he Utah law is settled that a wife cannot maintain
a tort action against her husband on his estate."
577 P.2d at 107.

The majority opinion in Hull would

apparently also agree with this statement, for in the
end of that opinion, despite its finding that a wife's
estate can maintain such an action, Justice Maughan
states that the decision makes no change in the interspousal irm:lunity rule.

This fact was noted by Judge

Hyde in the instant case, where in his Ruling on
Defendant's Motion for Sur:mJ.ary Judgt!lent, he stated
that the "overall effect of the Rull case seems to
reinforce the rule set out in Rubalcava."
POINT II. JURISDICTIONS ANALYZING STATUTES sn11LAR TO
UTAH'S AGREE THAT THEY DO NOT ESTABLISH THE RIGI-J:T TO
BRING A TORT ACTION AGAE1ST ONE'S SPOUSE.
In 1910 the United States Supreme Court interpreted
a District of Columbia statute which stated that
"(m)arried women shall have power to

. sue sepa.ratel:·
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. . . for torts cor:mitted against them, as fully and
freely as if they '.vere unI'larried . .
~·

at 617.

Thompson,

The Court found that this language did

not allow a woman to sue her husband in tort, but was
intended to allow her to bring tort actions in her own
name, thus taking away

Llu:

<..:uuuHu11

li:iw i:-ec.iuirement that

such actions be brought in the joint names of herself and
her husband.
The Supreme Court recognized there are debatable
policy arguments as to the Hisdom of the interspousal
irmnunity rule, but said that any change in the rule must
come from the le3islature.

Had Congress intended to

abrogate the doctrine, it could have written the District
of Cohllilbia statute in such a way as to express " . . .
that intent in terms of irresistible clearness." 218 U.S.
at 613.

Because it did not, the Court uas unwilling to

read into the statute such a far-reaching change in the
substantive law.
In Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178 (3rd Cir.
1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 919, a case in which a
woman sued her husband for an intentional tort, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a statute
almost identical to Section 30-2-2, Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
bv

a

The statute read "(c)ontracts ::iay be made
wife,

liabilities incurred, and the same

enforced by or a;sains t :1er in the same manner as if she
were unmarried."

446 F.2d at 180.

The court found
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that this statute did not give the woman the right to
maintain a tort action against her husband.

i>Toting ti1at r;1,

le6islature enacted this statute against the background of
corn::on law tort immunity, the court reasoned that if the
legislature had ir_tended to do away with i!r.munity, it would
have stated it clearly.
On similar grounds, the Montana Supreme Court ruled
that a suit brought by a woman's heirs against her husband's
estate was barred by the interfamily immunity doctrine.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Leary, 544 P.2d
444 (Mont. 1975), the court dismissed the action despite
the existence of a tA'.ontana statute giving a married woman
the "right to sue or be sued as though she were single."
Quoting from an earlier decision, the court stated that
these statutes "

. are

~rocedural

and create no new

rights, but only remove the colIIlllon law disability of
married women to enforce their rights otherwise created
and existing."

544 P.2d at 447, citing Dutton v. Hightower

& Lubrecht Construction Co., 214 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D.C.
Mont. 1963).
In 1978, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Childress
v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978) observed that it
did not believe state statutes gave spouses the right to
sue one another for torts occurring during the marriage.
It is interesting to note that the language of the
Tennessee statute is even broader than the Utah statutes,
and the court still did not interpret it to abolish the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

immunity doctrine.

That statute reads

. . every woman now married, or hereafter
to be married, shall ~ave the same capacity
to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy
rtnd dispose of all property, real and personal, in possession, and to make any contract
in reference to it, and to bind herself
personally, and to sue and be sued with all
the rights and incidents thereof, as if she
were not married. 569 S,W.2d at 818.
The Childress court did allow a woman to bring a tort
action against her husband, but only because the tort
occurred before they were married.

Stating the cause of

action had already been established prior to the marriage,
the court limited its holding to that type of situation,
and reaffirmed the fact that an action would not lie for a
tort occurring during the marriage.
Another case affi:nnin3 a woman's inability to sue
her husband in tort is Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334
(l!o. 1972).

Here a \Wmar. sued her ex-husband for injuries

received in an auto accident which occurred during the
marriage.

The court dismissed the action, holding that a

fon:ier wife could not recover damages, after the divorce,
from her former husband for a wrongful act collllllitted during
the marriage.

See also Short

Lin~

Inc. of Penn. v. Perez,

238 A. 2d 341 (Del. 1968).

The Ebel case is consistent with the general policy
that, if the action could not be brought during the
marriage because of the immunity doctrine, ti1e

~ere

fact

that the parties were divorced before the action was
1ctually filed does not alter the fact that the suit is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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barred.

As stated in 41 An.Jur.2d Husbands and Wives

§527 p.448:
Where husband and wife are not liable to
each other for torts committed by one
against the other during coverture, they
do not, on being divorced, become liable
to each other for torts co!r.l!'.itted before
the divorce . .
Appellant cites a nunber of cases in her brief in
which wives have been allowed to maintain tort actions
against their husbands.

However, the courts in these

cases were not faced with the same statutory language
which faces this Court.

For example, in Coffindaffer v.

Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W.Va. 1978), the court
based its abolition of interspousal iillI!lunity on the
following statute:
narried <voman !'lay sue and be sued ·without
joining her husband in the following cases:
. II. Where the action is between herself
and her husband. 244 S.E.2d. at 339, 340.

A

Moreover, in Coffindaffer the parties had separated and
a divorce action was pending prior to the husband's
tortious conduct.
Again in Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 Ohl. 1978),
another case relied on by Appellant, the court abolished
the illlI!lunity doctrine by relying on specific statutory
language which is not present in Utah law.

In ruling

that a woman could seek damages occasioned by her
h~sband's

intentional tort, the court utilized a Mary-

land statute which said "(m) arried women shall have the
power to . . . sue

. for torts committed against
-12-
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them, as fully as if they were unmarried."

390 A.2d at

79.
Nowhere in the Utah statutes is there such a specific
reference to a woman's ability to sue in tort.

Section

30-2-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953) mentions the ability
of a wife to bring tort actions when it states " . .
the wife may recover against a third person for such
injury or wrong a.s if unmarried . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
As noted by Justice Crockett in Rubalcava, supra,

the

plain ioport of this language is that a wife does not
have the ability to sue her husband in tort.
that "

He stated

. . the authorization to sue a third oerson

clearly manifests that this section was formulated in an
awareness that no right to sue the husband existed."
334 P.2d at 393 (Emphasis in the original.)
POH1T III. IF THE DOCTRIHE OF INTERSPOUSAL U1MUNITY IS
TO BE ABROGATED B UTAH, SUCH CI-WIGE HUST COHE FROM THE
LEGISLATURE, NOT THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
Much of Appellant's brief focuses on public policy
reasons for doing away with the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. These arguments are misdirected, for the
actual merits or demerits of the iunnunity principle are
not a proper subject of consideration in the instant
forum.

Justice Henriod aptly stated this in his dissent

to Taylor v. Patten, supra, at 703:
Everyone sympathizes with the beaten
wife and abhors the wife-beater
who almost
invariably assumes not only th~ role mentioned, but that of a coward. If what plaintiff alleges be true, a bread and water diet
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at an appropriate place for an extended
period of time would be all too good for
hi~.
Concededly there seems to be little
or no logical reason why a wife should be
able to recover against her husband for a
broken promise but not for a broken arm.
However, it is for the legislature, not
us, to give such a right.
[!'l] o end of
rhetoric or argument about public policy,
archaic principles, protected property
rights, obsolete fictions, historical sex
equality, destruction of the purpose of
marriage, and the like, can change the
basic. . . (conclusion) .
. that our
statutes have given a wife no clear,
specific right to sue her husband in tort,
and that we must resort, therefore, to
the common law, which denied her such right.
The fact that change :nust

co~e

from

t~1e

legislature

was re-asserted by Justice Crockett in the :najority
opinion of Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 393, where
he stated that".

. any change . . . should be :nade

by the legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all
may be advised what the change is and when it will be
effective."

Similarly, in Hull v. Silver, supra, at

107, Justice Hall wrote that "[i]f any change is to
be made in the law it should be by

legislative

enactment rather than by judicial fiat."
A recent Ohio case similarly refused to judicially
overturn the immunity doctrine.

In Varholla v. Varholla

383 H.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1978), the court stated there are
valid policy reasons for continuing the iIDI!lunity doctrine
It promotes marital harmony by discouraging otherwise
litigious spouses from pursuing real or fanciful claims
to the detriment of the family unit.

Additionally, it

prevents fraud and collusion at the expense of tactica'.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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disadvantaged insurance companies.

Because the doctrine

involves a matter of public policy, " . . . changes in this
area must emanate from the General Assembly, not the
courts."

383 N.E.2d at 889.

Additional support for the continuing validity of
interspousal tort immunity, and the concept that any
change must come from the legislature, can be found
in the following cases:

DiGirolamo v. Apanavage,

312 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1973); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d
142 (Fla. 1970); Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So.2d
154,155 (Fla.App, 1978).
One final cormnent should be made on the arguments
advanced in Appellant's brief.

On p.18 she points to

the Vtah Legislature's failure to ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment as evidence of its belief that women
are already fully emancipated in this state.

Apparently,

Appellant wants us to draw from this the conclusion that
the legislature believes women already have the right
to bring tort actions against their husbands.

However,

Appellant's argument is erroneous, for neither the
proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment, nor the existing
state equal rights provision (Utah Const. art. IV §1)
have anything to do with the doctrine of interspousal
tort irrnnunity.

This doctrine applies equally to men and

women, for while wives cannot sue their husbands for
torts cormnitted in the marriage, neither can husbands
sue their wives for tortious conduct during the course of
the marriage.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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C 0 N CL U S I 0 N
At common law, spouses clearly did not have the right
to bring tort actions against one another for wrongful
acts occurring during the course of the marriage.

Be-

cause the Utah Legislature has never enacted a statute
which confers such a right upon husbands and wives,
such actions are still prohibited by the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity.

The legislature itself

nust make such a change before actions such as the one
Appellant seeks to bring can be maintained in Utah.

The

lower court was correct in granting Respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and Respondent respectfully asks
this Court to affinn the disnissal of Appellant's
Complaint.
DATED this

day of August, 1979.

Warner
for Respondent
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